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ABSTRACT
Ante Rem Structuralism and the Myth of Identity Criteria. (May 2008)
Ho Kin Siu, B.A., The University of Hong Kong
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Christopher Menzel
This thesis examines the connections between the motivations of ante rem structuralism and the
problem of automorphism. Ante rem structuralists are led to the problem of automorphism because
of their commitment to the thesis of structure-relative identity. Ladyman's and Button's solutions
to the problem are both unsatisfactory. The problem can be solved only if ante rem structuralists
drop the thesis of structure-relative identity. Besides blocking the problem of automorphism, there
are further reasons why the thesis has to be dropped. (i) The purported metaphysical and epistemic
purchase of adopting the thesis can be put into doubt. (ii) Primitive identity within a mathematical
structure is more in line with ante rem structuralist's commitment to the faithfulness constraint
and to the ontological priority of structure over positions. However, the cost of dropping the thesis
is that ante rem structuralists cannot provide a satisfactory solution to Benacerraf's problem of
multiple reductions of arithmetic.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is motivated by my interest to know whether there is a feasible way for ante rem
structuralists to solve the problem of automorphism, a problem raised in Burgess [5] and articulated
forcefully by Keranen in his [15] and [16]. Different attempted solutions were offered, yet none of
them seems to successfully solve the problem. Jubien [13] brings to my attention the primitiveness
of identity. This leads me to see the problem in a different way: the problem should be dissolved
rather than solved. Given that identity is a primitive notion, problems are bound to arise if ante
rem structuralists make it supervene on relations and properties excluding haecceities. This makes
me ask the question: why ante rem structuralists are committed to the supervenience thesis in
the first place? To answer this question, I attempt to make a thorough assessment of ante rem
structuralism in order to identify the exact connections between its motivations and commitments
on one hand and the problem of automorphism on the other. The result of this assessment is the
followings which I try to establish in my thesis. (1) The problem of automorphism cannot be solved
without doing severe damage to ante rem structuralism. (2) Ante rem structuralists are led to the
problem of automorphism because of their commitment to relative identity  a thesis on which
identity supervenes on relations and properties  in providing a solution to the problem of multiple
reductions of arithmetic presented in Benacerraf [1]. (3) Ante rem structuralists are led to the thesis
of relative identity by their commitment to the faithfulness constraint, which motivates them to
take singular terms in mathematical sentences as denoting positions in some structured universals,
and to their tenet that a mathematical object has no properties except its relations with other
objects in the same structure taken to the extreme form as the thesis of incompleteness, according
to which there is no fact of the matter as to whether one object from one mathematical structure
is identical to an object from another structure. (4) The thesis of relative identity  at least in
its involvement in ante rem structuralism  can be put into doubt for reasons independent of the
problem of automorphism. (5) Taking identity to be primitive for mathematical objects in the
same structure can be accommodated into the framework of ante rem structuralism by appealing
to ante rem structuralists' commitment to the faithfulness constraint and the ontological priority
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2of structure over positions. (6) Without relative identity, ante rem structuralists fail to provide a
satisfactory solution to Benacerraf's problem.
In the first chapter, I seek to identify the motivations and commitments of ante rem structuralism
and explain why there is a temptation for ante rem structuralists to propose the theses of ontological
incompleteness of mathematical objects and relative identity as a solution to Benacerraf's problem
of multiple reductions of arithmetic.
In the second chapter, I explain why ante rem structuralists' solution to the Benacerraf problem
leads them into the problem of automorphism and argue that the problem cannot be solved without
doing severe damage to their program. I also argue that whereas the thesis of relative identity can be
put into doubt on independent grounds, primitive identity can be accommodated into the framework
of ante rem structuralism by appealing to its commitment to the faithfulness constraint and the
ontological priority of structure over positions.
In the third chapter, I seek to examine the consequences of dropping the thesis of relative
identity. I argue that the most important consequence is that the Benacerrafian problem, which
motivates various forms of structuralism, is left unsolved on ante rem structuralism. In the same
chapter, I discuss several ways in which my project complements Shapiro's recent thoughts ([31],
[32]) on the problem of automorphism.
3CHAPTER II
STRUCTURALISM AND ANTE REM STRUCTURALISM
This chapter has two aims. The first aim is to answer two separate questions: (1) why structural-
ism, as articulated by Benacerraf in [1], is an appealing guiding notion in philosophy of mathematics
and (2) why Resnik and Shapiro consider ante rem structuralism to be the best way of fleshing
out the details of structuralism. The reason why these two questions are separate is that although
ante rem structuralism is indeed inspired by Benacerraf's structuralist solution to the problem of
multiple reductions of arithmetic, ante rem structuralism is only one among several possible strate-
gies of formulating structuralism. Apart from ante rem structuralism, there are set theoretical
structuralism and modal structuralism. A survey of these alternative forms of structuralism will
make clear the desiderata which lead Resnik and Shapiro to propose ante rem structuralism as the
best way of formulating structuralism.
The second aim of this chapter is to set the stage for the discussion of the next chapter by raising
issues with ante rem structuralists' solution to the problem of multiple reductions of arithmetic 
namely, the coupling of the theses of ontological incompleteness of mathematical objects and relative
identity.
1. What Numbers Could Not Be?
The problem of multiple reductions of arithmetic
Benacerraf presents a serious challenge facing mathematical realism  the thesis that the truth of
mathematical statements is grounded in the existence of mathematical objects independent of us 
by telling a story of how two children, Ernie and Johnny, learn arithmetic in set theory.1 Whereas
Ernie is taught von Neumann's constructions of numbers  on which each number is the set of its
predecessors  Johnny is taught Zermelo's, on which each number is the singleton of its immediate
1Mathematical realism can be characterized in a more fine-grained way. See Resnik [28] (p.11); Hellman
[10] (p.2). According to Resnik's characterization, there are three conditions for mathematical realism:
(1) to be committed to the existence of mathematical objects; (2) to hold that our current understanding
of mathematics is true; (3) to hold that the existence of X s and the truth of statements about X s is
independent of us. According to Hellman's characterization, one can be a mathematical realist without being
committed to the existence of mathematical entities, if she holds that the truth of mathematical sentences
is independent of us. Since this thesis is concerned with ante rem structuralism which is committed to all
the conditions on Resnik's list, it suffices to use a more coarse-grained characterization of mathematical
realism.
4predecessor. Their opinions on numbers do not differ when asked about whether 1 + 2 = 3 (yes),
whether addition is associative (yes), or whether two numbers having the same successor can be
different (no). However, their opinions differ when they are asked whether the successor x′ of a
number x is such that x′ contains all of the members of x and x itself as its members, or whether
a number x is smaller than a number y if and only if x is a member of y. To both questions, Ernie
would answer: `Yes, that is how the successor function and the smaller-than relation are defined',
but Johny would demur: `No. 3 is a successor of 2 but it does not contain its only member, namely
1. Also, 1 is smaller than 3 but it is not a member of 3.' How can the disagreement between them
be settled? Whose number 3 is the real number 3?
The point behind Benacerraf's story is that if mathematical realists are to take numbers as sets,
then they have to be able to say which sets they are, that is, they have to provide truth values for the
identity statements 3 = {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}} and 3 = {{{∅}}}. They cannot say that both statements
are true, for the very simple reason that the two sets in question are different  Zermelo's 3 does
not contain {∅}, a member of von Neumann's 3. Nor can they say that both statements are false. If
they claim that they are false, then they have to explain why they know that is the case. However,
there is no evidence they can appeal to to make the judgment, because the difference between the
two constructions is extraneous to arithmetic itself. We never in our ordinary use of number words
talk about whether 2 belongs to 3, or whether 3 has three members. So, mathematical realists
cannot provide the truth values for the two identity statements in a principled way; therefore,
numbers cannot be sets.
It has to be noted that Benacerraf's argument is not restricted to sets. The same argument can
be given to any kind of objects purported to be numbers: the even von Neumann numbers or Frege's
classes, for example. Also, his argument is not restricted to natural numbers alone. Mathematical
realists will face the same problem if they try to ask questions about the identity of a real number,
a point on the Euclidean plane, or an element in a 3-member group. So, Benacerraf's conclusion
should be taken to be much stronger: mathematical entities generally are not objects.
Benacerraf's structuralist solution to the problem
If numbers are not objects, there are two questions for Benacerraf to answer: (i) How should we
treat the singular terms and quantifiers in mathematical sentences? (ii) How should we characterize
the subject matter of mathematics?
5Benacerraf's answer to the first question is that we should resist the temptation to treat singular
terms and quantifiers in mathematical sentences as referring to extra-linguistic objects  in his
own words: There are not two kinds of things, numbers and number words, but just one, the words
themselves ([1], p.292). So, he seems to suggest that we should treat the following two kinds of
sentences with different semantics:
(1) John and Mary give birth to May
(2) There is a dog between two cats
(3) 2 + 3 = 5
(4) There is a natural number between 2 and 4
Whereas we should evaluate sentences (1) and (2) model-theoretically, that is to take the singular
terms `John', `Mary' and `May' in (1) and the quantifiers in (2) as referring to objects in the world,
we should not do the same with (3) and (4); otherwise we commit ourselves to some extra-linguistic
objects and run into the problem Benacerraf raises.
Benacerraf's answer to the second question is as follows. Any system of objects, be it sets or not,
that forms a recursive progression satisfying the axioms of arithmetic is adequate. That different
systems are adequate does not show that numbers can be identified with the elements of these
systems. Rather, it shows that the individuality of each element in the systems is extraneous
to arithmetic. What matters for arithmetic are the relations these objects hold to each other in
the system they belong to, that is, the structure which [these objects] jointly exhibit. So, the
subject matter of arithmetic is the abstract structure that all progressions have in common merely
in virtue of being progressions; it is not concerned with particular objects  the numbers.
Focusing on the structural relations among mathematical entities rather than the intrinsic na-
ture of each of them taken in isolation, Benacerraf's solution is structuralist in spirit. The appeal
of structuralism is that it comports with mathematical practice. In [4], Bourbaki illustrates how
the intrinsic nature of mathematical entities is left out in mathematical practice with the example
of three apparently distinct mathematical structures: (a) real numbers under addition, (b) inte-
gers under multiplication modulo a prime number p, and (c) displacements in three-dimensional
Euclidean space under composition. Despite their apparent differences, they all satisfy the group
axioms  in virtue of having an associative operation, an identity element, and an inverse for each
element in the structure  and can be treated in the same manner. For example, the cancellation
6law applies to the three structures in exactly the same way. In mathematics, there is no reason to
give up a more economical way of talking about structures just because the intrinsic natures of the
entities in them are different.
Assessment of the solution
Although Benacerraf's suggestions do seem to solve the problem he raises and comport with math-
ematical practice, they raise the following issues. First, his answers to questions (i) and (ii) seem to
be jointly inconsistent. In answering (i), he claims that numbers are not objects. There he seems
to be suggesting an eliminativist solution to the problem he raises, which goes in this way: since
numbers are not objects, the reference of the number word `2' is eliminated. Therefore, there is no
issue with whether 2 = {{∅}} or not, for the simple reason that `2' has no denotation. However, in
answering (ii), he claims that arithmetic elaborates an abstract structure, in which the  `elements'
have no properties other than those relating them to other `elements' [in it]. It is not clear whether
the abstract structure and the elements he refers to exist or not. If they do, Benacerraf is hard-
pressed to answer the question of whether number words are indeed singular terms, now referring
to the elements in the abstract structure, rather than to the various set theoretical reductions of
them. Even if he is using metaphorical language there, he does not show how a structuralism
without abstract structures can be worked out.
Second, if we have to pay a high price for evaluating mathematical sentences in the model-
theoretic way and hence need to adopt a different semantics for mathematics, what would the
semantics look like? Do we have to pay an even higher price in adopting an alternative semantics?
Third, could a mathematical realist, following Benacerraf's suggestion, treat mathematical ob-
jects as having no intrinsic nature other than their relations with other objects in the same structure
and hence rule out questions about their intrinsic nature  whether they are identical to particular
sets  from the start? This seems to be an option that Benacerraf fails to consider in length.
These are questions that any follower of structuralism has to answer. Different ways of answering
these questions, as we will see, lead to the different ways of solving Benacerraf's problem in the
structuralist spirit.2
2For a survey of different forms of structuralism, see: Parsons's [21]; Shapiro's [30] (pp. 84-90); Reck
and Price's [26]; Hellman's [12].
72. Set Theoretical Structuralism and Modal Structuralism
In the following, I discuss two forms of structuralism other than ante rem structuralism: set the-
oretical structuralism and modal structuralism. By comparing ante rem structuralism with these
alternative accounts, I seek to highlight the main desiderata of ante rem structuralism.
Set theoretical structuralism (STS)
There are two versions of this form of structuralism: the relative version and the universalized
version. On both accounts there is no fact of the matter as to what is the natural number structure
or what is the number 2. No structure is privileged over the others; any structures that satisfy the
axioms of arithmetic, that is, having the correct structure, are adequate. It is in this sense that
they are both structuralist in spirit. They both do not countenance the existence of an abstract
structure suggested by Benacerraf. On both accounts, a structure is a set theoretical structure, a set
or k -tuple with a domain of objects together with certain functions and relations on the domain,
satisfying certain given conditions [e.g. certain axioms] ([21], p. 274). The truth of mathematical
sentences is explained in terms of truth in set theoretical structures, rather than in some abstract
structures whose nature is not spelled out in detail by Benacerraf. They differ only at the issue
of whether mathematical sentences should be treated with a different semantics. On the relative
version, a sentence of arithmetic is taken at face value relative to a particular structure; no novel
semantics is called for. On the universalized version, a sentence of arithmetic is not taken at face
value; rather it is taken to be a more complex second-order universal quantification sentence about
all structures of arithmetic.
STS, Relative Version
This version is a structuralist articulation of our usual model-theoretic understanding of a sentence.
It provides a deflationary solution to Benacerraf's problem. A mathematical sentence is true if it
is true in a particular structure of an isomorphic type. For example, suppose we use the language
{0,+, ·, S,<}, the sentence 2 + 3 = 5 can be translated as 0′′ + 0′′′ = 0′′′′′, which can then be taken
at face value in a particular structure satisfying the axioms of arithmetic. 0′′, 0′′′, and 0′′′′′ are
all singular terms denoting objects in the domain of that particular structure. So, the number 2
is the object denoted by 0′′ in that particular structure, and that particular structure is a natural
8number structure. There is no such thing as the number 2 or the natural number structure. There
is no point in asking whether the number 2 is identical to the set {∅, {∅}}, without first fixing a
particular structure. So, according to this view, Benacerraf's problem is not an issue in the first
place.
STS, Universalized Version
This version is different from the relative version in that it does not take a mathematical sentence
at its face value. It eliminates the reference of number words by taking a sentence of arithmetic
as a general statement about all structures satisfying the axioms of arithmetic. To describe this
program in a more concrete way, I discuss how a sentence of arithmetic can be translated into a
general statement about all structures of arithmetic using a translation scheme.3 First, we need to
define the sentence AX which will figure in any translation of a given sentence of arithmetic. It is
defined as the conjunction of Robinson's axioms and the second order induction principle, which
are taken as the axioms of the natural number structure.4
Induction principle: ∀X((X0 ∧ (∀x)(Xx→ Xx′))→ ∀xXx)
AX = conjunction of Robinson's axioms ∧ induction principle
Second, we translate a sentence of arithmetic φ into our language {0,+, ·, S,<}. For example, if
the given sentence is 2 + 3 = 5, we translate it into 0′′ + 0′′′ = 0′′′′′. If the sentence is there is
a natural number between 2 and 4, we translate it into ∃x(0′′ < x ∧ x < 0′′′′). Next, we turn
the translated sentence into a general sentence about all structures of natural numbers of following
canonical form:
∀Pxfgjk[AXP (x/0, f/+, g/·, j/S, k/ <)→ φP (x/0, f/+, g/·, j/S, k/ <)] (φUSTS)
where `P ' is a 1-place relation variable; `x ' is an individual variable ranging over the elements in
P ; `f ', `g ' are 2-place function variables; `j ' a 1-place function variable; and `k ' is a 2-place relation
variable. The subscript P over AX and φ indicates that the quantifiers in them are relativized to
P. This translation is intended to mean for a sentence of arithmetic φ to be true, it is true in all
structures satisfying the axioms of arithmetic i.e. AX.
3For the details of the program, see Reck and Price's [26]; McCarthy's [19] (pp. 137-138).
4See [3], p. 208 for Robinson's axioms.
9For the sentences 0′′ + 0′′′ = 0′′′′′ and ∃x(0′′ < x ∧ x < 0′′′′), once they are translated into
the canonical form, there are no determinate objects for 0′′ and 0′′′′ to refer to. They now act as
bound variables rather than singular terms. The objects to which they are assigned vary across
structures. The same applies to the quantifier in ∃x(0′′ < x∧ x < 0′′′′), because different structures
have different domains and its range is relativized to them. So, reference of number words and
quantifiers is eliminated on this account. Since number words turn out to have no reference on this
account, proponents of this account are not under the burden of providing truth values for such
identity sentences as 2 = {∅, {∅}} and 2 = Caesar.
Problems with STS
There are several problems with both forms of set theoretical structuralism. First, while the relative
version takes for granted the existence of set theoretical structures for arithmetic, the universalized
version takes for granted the existence of functions and relations, which are ranged over by the
quantifiers. Where do these objects come from? Suppose our ontology fails to contain these objects,
then all sentences of arithmetic  including the ones that are false  are all vacuously true. On
the relative version, if there does not exist any structure of arithmetic, all sentences of arithmetic
are trivially true in all structures. On the universalized version, if there do not exist functions
and relations that can satisfy the axioms of arithmetic, the translation of any given sentence of
arithmetic φ is trivially true. This problem is called the problem of non-vacuity. The natural
solution for both accounts is to use set theory to provide an abundant number of objects so that
we have enough objects to ensure the non-vacuity of mathematical truth. The cost of treating set
theory this way, however, is to treat it non-structurally. In explaining the truth of sentences of
a given theory in terms of set theoretical structures satisfying its axioms, we relieve ourselves of
the burden of giving an account of the absolute nature of the objects of the theory in question.
Any structure that satisfies the axioms will do; there is no determinate class of objects that can
be identified with a particular theory. However, if we take a particular set theory to define a
determinate class of objects, namely sets, we cannot avoid answering questions about their nature.
Do we know whether there is a set x such that x = Caesar? How do we know that no set can be
Caesar? Among the many set theories available, why are only the sets of the chosen set theory
real? So, set theoretical structuralism, rather than solving Benacerraf's problem, seems to defer it
to the level of sets.
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Second, as Benacerraf argues in his [2], one desideratum of a philosophical account of mathe-
matical truth is that there need to be cognitive connections between the truth conditions and our
true beliefs. Both accounts seem to fail to honor this desideratum. It is not clear how we can
have epistemic access to set theoretical structures, abstract entities with which we have no causal
contact.
Third, the universalized version fails to honor another desideratum Benacerraf points out, that
is, to use a uniform semantics for both mathematics and the rest of our language. It is not clear
whether sentences of mathematics do have the logical form stipulated by the account, and how we
can explain the asymmetry between mathematical language and the rest of our language.
Modal structuralism (MS)
Like the proponents of the universalized version of STS, modal structuralists do not respect the
surface logical form of a mathematical sentence; they solve the Benacerrafian problem by eliminating
the reference of singular terms and quantifiers in mathematical sentences. In light of the problems
facing the proponents of the universalized version of STS  namely their failure to treat set
theory structurally and the difficulty of accounting for our knowledge of sets  modal structuralists
improve the universalized version of STS by modalizing the translation φUSTS discussed above. The
motivation for introducing modal notions is to eliminate reference to all abstract objects  including
sets  so that the problems facing proponents of the universalized version of STS can be avoided.
I now discuss in further detail how this account works. Instead of taking a sentence of arithmetic
φ as elliptical for φ is true in any structure of arithmetic as on the universalized version of STS,
this account takes it to be elliptical for if X were any structure of of arithmetic, φ would hold in
X  ([10], p. 16), which modal structuralists express formally in the following sentence:
∀Pxfgjk[AXP (x/0, f/+, g/·, j/S, k/ <)→ φP (x/0, f/+, g/·, j/S, k/ <)] (φMS)
Despite the presence of a necessity operator in the sentence, modal structuralists do not interpret
the sentence using possible world semantics, because to do so is to be committed to abstract objects
such as possible worlds, which are what they seek to eliminate. The introduction of the necessity
operator at the front of the sentence, rather, is intended to eliminate reference to all abstract
mathematical objects (including sets). With the universal quantifiers placed within the scope of
11
the necessity operator, [t]here is literally no quantification over objects at all in [φMS ] ([11], p.
316).
Since φMS is intended to mean if X were a structure of arithmetic, φ would hold in X , modal
structuralists would be faced with a modal version of the problem of non-vacuity if the existence of
a structure of arithmetic is not possible, that is, if the following sentence is not true:
♦∃Pxfgjk(AXP )
Proponents of the universalized version of STS are forced to solve the problem of non-vacuity by
taking set theory as specifying a class of objects which are numerous enough to guarantee the non-
vacuity of mathematical truth. However, once they make this move, as we discussed above, they
have to answer difficult questions about the identity of sets and about our knowledge of sets. So, this
move does not seem to be promising. It is less so for modal structuralists because their motivation is
to eliminate reference to all abstract objects  including sets. Due to these considerations, Hellman
does not rely on set theory to establish the possibility of the existence of a structure of arithmetic.
Rather, he seeks to establish the possibility along what he calls quasi-constructive lines ([10], p.
29). His idea seems to be that we can stipulate a rule which prescribes how a sequence of concrete
marks, which is isomorphic to a structure of arithmetic, can be constructed. Even though such a
sequence of concrete marks does not exist in the actual world, it is a logical possibility that it might
([11], p. 317). So, on MS, the existence of a structure of arithmetic can be shown to be possible
without recourse to a non-structuralist interpretation of set theory.
Two issues can be raised with this program. First, as with the universalized version of set
theoretical structure, the major problem with this account is that its translations, purported to
capture the real logical forms of mathematical sentences, further deviate from the apparent ones. It
is questionable whether modal notions do figure as prominently in mathematics as the translations
seem to suggest. Second, it is not clear how we know that the existence of a sequence of concrete
marks isomorphic to a structure of arithmetic is logically possible. It seems Hellman trades the
epistemological problems concerning abstract objects for epistemological problems concerning what
is logically possible. The issue of whether the latter kind of epistemological problems is more
tractable than the former, however, is beyond the scope of this thesis.5
5For discussions about the epistemological problems facing modal structuralism, see Hale's [9].
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2. Ante rem Structuralism
Desiderata of ante rem structuralism
Ante rem structuralism is the only structuralist program which rejects Benacerraf's conclusion
that numbers are not objects and takes literally his suggestion that arithmetic is about an abstract
structure, in which the `elements' ... have no properties other than those relating them to other
`elements' of the same structure ([1], p. 291). Ante rem structuralists hold that numbers are what
Benacerraf calls the elements in the abstract structure of arithmetic; they exist and are referred to
by singular terms and quantifiers in mathematical sentences. So, their program is non-eliminativist.
Ante rem structuralists extend this view to all mathematical objects  numbers of other number
systems, objects in a group, sets ... All of them are taken as positions in abstract structures. As
positions, they do not have any internal structure or intrinsic nature; they have no properties other
than their relations with other positions in the same structure.
There are three desiderata which lead ante rem structuralists to propose this account as the
way out for Benacerraf's problem. First, ante rem structuralists think that by taking mathematical
sentences at their face value  that is , to take the singular terms and quantifiers in them as referring
to objects in our ontology  they can reach an interpretation of mathematics that is more faithful
to mathematical practice. Shapiro articulates the importance of this desideratum, which he calls the
`faithfulness constraint', in the following way: the goal of philosophy of mathematics is to interpret
mathematics, and articulates its place in the overall intellectual enterprise. One desideratum is
to have an interpretation that takes as much as possible of what mathematicians say about their
subject as literally true, understood at or near face value ([31], p. 110). This desideratum is one
of the reasons why ante rem structuralists do not find modal structuralism attractive. For modal
structuralists, 2+3 = 5 is true because, if there were any structure of arithmetic, the sentence would
hold in it. It is not true because three objects in our ontology  namely the numbers 2, 3, and 5
 are in the relation described by the sentence; there are no such things as numbers according to
modal structuralists. However, to so interpret the sentence, according to ante rem structuralists,
is not to treat the sentence as literally true. The numerals 2, 3 and 5, taken literally, refer to three
distinct mathematical objects, namely the numbers 2, 3, and 5. The sentence 2 + 3 = 5 is true
because it says correctly of how the numbers 2, 3, and 5 are related to each other in the ante rem
structure of arithmetic.
13
Second, ante rem structuralists are not satisfied with set theoretical structuralists' move of
treating set theory non-structurally. Alongside different set theories, there are other theories which
can provide a background ontology for mathematics; it is highly contentious which theory is taken
to be the background theory ([30], p. 87). Also, set theory, like other theories in mathematics, is a
study of a mathematical structure; the set theoretic hierarchy ... is a pattern along with others
([27], p. 539). There is no reason to think that other theories are dependent on it. Therefore, ante
rem structuralists think it is important to not give any privilege to set theory. Set theory has to
be accommodated by any structuralist accounts.
Third, ante rem structuralists think that the epistemology of mathematics is more tractable if
a mathematical object is always dependent for its existence on the structure to which it belongs,
and has no intrinsic properties other than its relations with other mathematical objects in the
same structure. They believe that this construal of the nature of mathematical objects can be
well-supported by novel epistemic strategies such as pattern recognition and abstraction.6
General outline of ante rem structuralism
Since Benacerraf, quite likely, is using metaphorical language when mentioning the abstract struc-
ture of arithmetic, he does not discuss in detail the nature of the abstract structure and of the
elements in them. This job is taken up by ante rem structuralists. They agree with Benacerraf that
the elements, which they call positions, in the abstract structure of arithmetic are structureless
([27], p. 530). There is no more to the individual numbers `in themselves' than the relations they
bear to each other ([30], p. 73).
Resnik and Shapiro go further than Benacerraf by providing further details of the the positions
and of the abstract structure itself. A position in a structure, on ante rem structuralism, has a
dual character. Seen from one perspective, a position from the natural number structure is an
object. Seen from another perspective, a position is a role or what Shapiro calls an office. It can
be occupied by a position from another structure  a set, for example  taken as an object.
Shapiro introduces the distinction between system and structure to show how the fact that
there are different isomorphic set theoretical structures for arithmetic can be understood in the
framework of ante rem structuralism ([30], pp. 73-74; 99). Any one of the set theoretical structures
6For details of ante rem structuralists' epistemological program, see chapter 4 of Shapiro's [30] and chapter 11 of
Resnik's [28].
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of arithmetic 〈N, 0, S〉 is now called a system, which according to Shapiro is a collection of objects
with certain relations. Objects from a system of arithmetic can occupy the positions of the ante
rem structure of arithmetic  taken as offices. The system is then said to exemplify the natural
number structure, which is the abstract form of [the system], highlighting the interrelationships
among the objects, and ignoring any features of them that do not affect how they relate to other
objects in the system. For Shapiro, the criterion of exemplification is highly permissive. As
long as there are enough objects  be they abstract or concrete  and they are in the right
relation  for example, ordered by the successor relation  they can be taken as a system which
exemplifies a mathematical structure; no further restriction is imposed on them. This characteristic
is what makes an ante rem mathematical structure different from other abstract structures such as
a particular chess pattern. A pattern isomorphic to a chess pattern cannot be a chess pattern if the
objects which exemplify it are not chess pieces or are chess pieces that do not stand in the correct
distance from one another. The abstract structure of a chess pattern, therefore, will cease to exist
if there are no longer chess pieces which stand in the correct distance from one another. An ante
rem structure, in contrast, is freestanding. Take the ante rem structure of natural numbers. It is
exemplified by itself, because it consists of positions ordered by the successor relation. It is also
exemplified by the system containing its even numbers or the von Neumann ordinals (which are
positions from a set theoretical structure) ordered by a successor relation. Even if the existence of a
universal is parasitic on its exemplifications by particulars, given the way an ante rem structure is
characterized, it is necessary that there is an abundant supply of positions that exemplify it. This
explains why ante rem structuralism is so called.7
7In this exposition, I take Shapiro's views on structure to be the default rather than Resnik's. On Shapiro's view,
a structure is an object, to be ranged over by a special quantifier for structures ([30], p. 93). On Resnik's view,
however, a structure cannot be an object. One of the reasons why he thinks so is that in trying to provide identity
conditions for structures, one has to establish relations between objects from one structure to those of another. For
example, if isomorphism is used as a criterion of identity for structures as on Shapiro's account ([30], p. 93), we need
to find a function that maps objects from one structure to those of another structure. This move is incompatible
with the ante rem structuralists' tenet that a mathematical object has no property apart from its relations with
other objects in the same structure, because if mapping from one structure to another is allowed, an object from
one structure has the extra-structural property of being mapped to an object in another structure. Despite Resnik's
caution, his view is incoherent. On one hand, mathematical objects, according to him, are structureless positions
in a structure ([27], p. 530). On the other, he claims that a structure is not an `individual' (which I take to be
synonymous with `object')  in his own words: unless we make radical revisions in our logical notation, speaking
of patterns as identical or distinct is to treat them as individuals, since identity is a relation between individuals
([28], pp. 209-210). He leaves us in the dark as to whether there exists structures for mathematical objects to
exist-in. Due to this inconsistency in Resnik's version of ante rem structuralism, I take Shapiro's version to be a
more defensible account of ante rem structuralism.
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Solution to the problem: ontological incompleteness of mathematical objects
How can this elaborate account of mathematical structures solve Benacerraf's problem? Before
discussing their solution to the problem, it is important to recognize the shape of Benacerraf's
problem. The problem he raises has to do with various identity statements such as 2 = {{∅}}; 2 =
{∅,{∅}}; 2 = Caesar. These identity sentences are all grammatical. In all of them, an identity symbol
is placed between two singular terms. Benacerraf's question is to ask whether one can provide a
truth value for them in a principled way. Mathematical realists run into problems because they
do not have a principled way of providing truth values for the sentences. Benacerraf's solution is
to eliminate the reference of `2' so that the identity sentences become ungrammatical and hence
do not demand from us a truth value. On ante rem structuralism, 2,{{∅}},{∅, {∅}} are all taken
at face value. They are singular terms referring to positions in structures. `2' refers to the 2-
position in the natural number structure. {{∅}} and {∅, {∅}} refer to two distinct positions in a
set theoretical structure. It is, however, not clear how characterizing a mathematical object as a
structureless position in a structure can by itself solve the problem; the identity symbol does not
seem to respect whether the objects denoted by the two singular terms it flanks are structureless
or not. In the following, we will examine whether ante rem structuralists have a good strategy to
tackle the problem.
The solution to the problem proposed by Resnik and supported by Shapiro [30] is the thesis of
ontological incompleteness of mathematical objects.8 The upshot of the thesis is that it is not that
we do not know the truth values of 2 = {{∅}}; 2 = {∅,{∅}}; 2 = Caesar; it is that there are no
such facts to be known about the number 2. This thesis is articulated in one way or the other by
Resnik and Shapiro:
Mathematical objects are incomplete in the sense that we have no answers within or
without mathematics to questions of whether the objects one mathematical theory dis-
cusses are identical to those another treats; whether, for example, geometrical points
are real numbers ([28], p. 90).
I want to add a caveat to my epistemic turn. Characterizing my structuralism as
epistemic may suggest to some that the incompleteness of mathematical objects is to
8In the literature, incompleteness is often taken to be synonymous with ante rem structuralism's slogan that
a mathematical object has no intrinsic properties other than its relations it bears with other objects in the same
structure. However, in this thesis, I take incompleteness to be a thesis restricted to cross-structural identity of
mathematical objects.
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be understood as the thesis that there really is a fact of the matter as to whether,
say, numbers are sets, but it is an unknowable fact. This is not my view. The only
unknowable facts that I have recognized are those we can credit to bivalence, and I have
proposed restricting bivalence to avoid the facts associated with the incompleteness of
mathematical objects ([28], p. 270, emphasis mine).
It makes no sense to pursue the identity between a place in the natural-number structure
and some other object, expecting there to be a fact of the matter. Identity between
natural numbers is determinate; identity between numbers and other sorts of objects is
not, and neither is identity between numbers and the positions of other structures ([30],
p. 79).
This thesis is claimed by Resnik to be an epistemic turn. The nature of a mathematical object
is such that identity statements about two objects from two different mathematical structures
either make no sense or are neither true nor false. The thesis seems to be in line with ante rem
structuralism's tenet that a mathematical object has no properties other than its relations with
other objects in the same structure. The sentences 2 = {{∅}}, 2 = {∅,{∅}}, 2 = Caesar seem to
demand us to concede that a mathematical object does have properties other than its relations
with other mathematical objects in the same structure, which is unacceptable according to ante
rem structuralists. So, there is a temptation for ante rem structuralists to treat these sentences as
either senseless or neither true nor false. We will consider in detail whether the temptation should
be resisted in the next chapter.
Two questions are in order. (i) What are Resnik's and Shapiro's arguments for this thesis?
(ii) Can the ante rem structuralist slogan that a mathematical object has no properties other
than its relations with other mathematical objects in the same structure be accepted without
careful qualifications? We first answer the second question. The answer to the question is `no'. If
mathematical objects have only structural properties, it is not clear how we can ever have knowledge
of them or apply them. Does the number 2 have the property of being known by most of us, and
the property of being the the number of biological parents a human being has? Also, the property
of being self-identical has nothing to do with structural relations. So, ante rem structuralism's
tenet that a mathematical object has only structural properties cannot be accepted without careful
qualifications. (i) is therefore an important question; it asks whether the tenet can be accepted with
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respect to cross-structural identity-facts about mathematical objects as the thesis of incompleteness
demands.
One argument Resnik often uses in supporting the incompleteness of mathematical objects is
the argument from mathematical practice. A typical example is the following: mathematical
realists are not committed to claims about mathematical objects beyond those they hold by virtue
of endorsing the claims of mathematics. Since mathematics recognizes no facts of the matter in
the puzzling cases, mathematical realists are free to develop solutions that do not recognize them
either ([28], p. 92).
However, it is not clear how appeal to mathematical practice alone can solve philosophical
problems about the nature of mathematical objects, which is outside of mathematicians' inquiry.
It is also not clear how Resnik can infer from the fact that mathematics recognizes no facts of the
matter concerning the sentence 2 = {{∅}} that there is no such fact of the matter. To so infer is
to confuse an epistemological question with an ontological question.
The second argument for the thesis of incompleteness addresses directly the preliminary remarks
I made at the beginning of this section. It seeks to argue for the meaninglessness of an identity
statement like 2 = {{∅}} in a more subtle way. It puts forward a thesis of relative identity which
restricts the scope of identity symbol to objects of one particular kind, within which criteria of
identity can be provided for the objects.9 It was articulated in length by Benacerraf [1] and was
endorsed by Shapiro [30] who then associates it with the Quinean dictum of no entity without
identity:
I propose to deny that all identities are meaningful, in particular to discard all questions
of the form of (c) above [e.g. 17 = {{{∅}}}; Caesar = {{∅}}] as senseless or unseman-
tical ... Identity statements make sense only in contexts where there exists possible
individuating conditions. If an expression of the form x=y is to have a sense, it can be
only in contexts where it is clear that both x and y are of the some kind or category C,
and that it is the conditions which individuate things as the same C which are operative
and determine its truth value. (Benacerraf [1], pp. 286-287).
`Frege's preliminary account does not have anything to say about the truth-value of the
9It is important to clarify that they are not committed to relative identity in the following sense: (R) there are
distinct properties F and G such that a = b is true relative to the property F while a = b is false relative to the
property G, and either G(a) or G(b) is true. This form of relative identity violates the indiscernibility of identicals.
If a and b refer to the same F, they refer to the same G, for any property G. For example, a and b refer to the same
horse, it cannot be that a and b refer to two distinct white things. See chapter 1 of Wiggins [33] for details.
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identity Julius Caesar = 2. This quandary has come to be called the Caesar problem.
A solution to it should determine how and why each number is the same or different from
any object whatsoever. The Caesar problem is related to the Quinean dictum that we
need criteria to individuate items in our ontology. If we do not have an identity relation,
then we do not have bona fide objects. The slogan is no entity without identity ([30],
p. 78).
The Frege-Benacerraf questions do not have determinate answers, and they do not need
them ([30], p. 80).
Quine's thesis is that within a given theory, language, or framework, there should be
definite criteria for identity among its objects. There is no reason for structuralism to
be the single exception to this ([30], p. 92).
Shapiro's proposal here is that the identity symbol is restricted to objects of some kind within
which certain individuating conditions or criteria of identity can be provided for the objects. 2 = 3
has a determinate truth value, because 2 and 3 are both in the natural number structure; we can
tell one apart from the other by appealing to the different structural relations they exhibit in the
structure. 2 = 3 is false because, whereas 2 has two predecessors, 3 has three predecessors. The
same cannot be done with respect to the identity 2 = {{∅}}. Neither the axiom of extensionality
nor the successor relation can allow us to differentiate one from the other. So this identity statement
is meaningless, or we have to be committed to that both the number 2 and the set {{∅}} are not
objects, which is unacceptable according to ante rem structuralism.
Appealing as this solution might seem, we will see in the next chapter that it should be dropped
because it leads to serious difficulties for ante rem structuralism.
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CHAPTER III
THE PROBLEM OF AUTOMORPHISM AND THE NOTION OF IDENTITY
CRITERIA
To pave the way for the discussion of this chapter, I now describe, in a more schematic way, what
Shapiro [30] is committed to in his adoption of Benacerraf's proposal of relative identity. Their
proposal of putting restrictions on identity can be captured by the following logical form:
(IC) ∀x∀y(Fx ∧ Fy → (x = y ↔ ϕF (x, y)))
Its intended meaning is that for any two objects x and y belonging to a kind F , they are the same
object if and only if they satisfy an equivalence relation ϕF suitable for kind F . The equivalence
relation is intended to provide the criteria of identity for objects belonging to kind F . Appealing
to the Quinean dictum of no entity without identity, Shapiro seems to suggest in his [30] that
the schema (IC) should be adopted for his structuralist account of mathematics. He takes objects
belonging to the same ante rem structure as belonging to the same kind; the identity of the objects
in each structure has to be governed by an equivalence relation which can be expressed in terms of
their relations to each other. For example, objects in the natural number structure and objects in a
set theoretical structure, according to the proposal, should have their identity governed by schemas
like the followings:
(N) ∀x∀y(Number(x) ∧Number(y)→ (x = y ↔ ∀z(z < x↔ z < y)))
(AE) ∀x∀y((Set(x) ∧ Set(y))→ (x = y ↔ ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)))
The equivalence relation ϕ(x, y) in (N) having the same predecessors i.e.∀z(z < x ↔ z < y), on
this proposal, can be said to govern the identity of natural numbers. Similarly, the equivalence
relation having the same members i.e.∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y) governs the identity of sets.
The reason why Shapiro [30] adopts this strategy, as we have discussed in the last chapter,
is to allow an ante rem structuralist to rule out identity statements involving two objects from
different structures, by appealing to the fact that their identity is not appropriately governed by
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the schema. With all these identities ruled out, an ante rem structuralist can maintain the thesis
of incompleteness of mathematical objects and hence block the Benacerrafian question of whether
one object from one structure is identical to an object from another structure.
Several preliminary questions concerning this proposal are in order. First, if Shapiro's thesis
of relative identity is invoked only to maintain the incompleteness of mathematical objects, it
appears to be an ad hoc move. Can ante rem structuralists provide an independent justification for
their thesis about identity? Second, it is not clear whether and why the identity relations among
mathematical objects have to be governed by other relations. Any object is identical to itself and
to no other objects, and necessarily so. This seems to be a logical fact that need not be grounded
on any other facts. Can identity of mathematical objects within any given structure be analyzed
in the way Shapiro suggests? Third, it is not clear whether identities not governed by the schema
Shapiro endorses are really senseless. Take the identity statements (i) a chess piece is identical to
the natural number 2 and (ii) every natural number is equal to the sum of two real numbers i.e.
∀x(Natural(x)→ ∃y∃z(Real(y) ∧ Real(z) ∧ x = y+ z)). The objects to be identified in these two
sentences fall outside of any identity schema, because there is not an ante rem structure to which
both the chess piece and the natural number 2 belong, or one to which both the natural numbers
and the real numbers belong. However, it seems that we are able to reasonably explain why (i) is
false and (ii) is true without appealing to any identity schema. Consider (i): the natural number 2 is
freestanding on ante rem structuralism; it therefore exists necessarily, whereas the chess piece does
not. So, the natural number 2 cannot be a chess piece. Consider (ii): for every natural number, take
0 and itself to be the required real numbers. The sentence, though not mathematically interesting,
is obviously true.
It seems that ante rem structuralists have to pay a high price in demanding a structure relative
grounding of identity. The main question this chapter tries to answer is whether the price is right.
I will answer the question in the negative. I will argue that the problem of automorphism is an
inevitable result of Shapiro's thesis of relative identity; that Ladyman's and Button's solutions to
the problem are both unsatisfactory; and finally that the demand for kind-relative identity criteria,
though well-entrenched in philosophy, can be put into doubt and therefore has little purchase in
discussions of metaphysical and epistemological issues surrounding ante rem structuralism.
21
1. The Problem of Automorphism
The problem of automorphism is one of the most discussed issues on ante rem structuralism. It
was raised by Burgess in his [5] and elaborated by Keranen in [15] and [16]. The upshot of the
problem is that in appealing to structural relations to provide criteria of identity for mathematical
objects, ante rem structuralists are committed to the view that structurally indiscernible objects
are identical.
I now discuss in detail the shape of the problem. Shapiro's proposal of relative identity works
perfectly well for natural numbers and sets. With them, ante rem structuralists can restrict their
identity relations using the following two schemas:
(N) ∀x∀y(Number(x) ∧Number(y)→ (x = y ↔ ∀z(z < x↔ z < y)))
(AE) ∀x∀y((Set(x) ∧ Set(y))→ (x = y ↔ ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)))
Using these schemas, ante rem structuralists can provide a basis for the identities of natural numbers
and sets by appealing to their structural relations alone. In doing so, they honor the Quinean dictum
of `no entity without identity'  or more precisely, `no entity without identity criteria'  without
attributing to numbers and sets any non-structural properties, a move that runs against their tenet
that a mathematical object has no properties other than its relations with other objects in the same
structure.
However, ante rem structuralists run into problems when they are asked to provide identity
criteria for mathematical objects belonging to structures which admit of non-trivial automorphisms.
We will see why if we appeal to the homomorphism theorem. Let A be the structure of a language
L and j be a homomorphism from A into A. Let a1, ..., an be the objects in the domain of A. For
any formula φ(x1, ..., xn) of L, |=A φ(a1, ..., an) ⇔|=A φ(j(a1), ..., j(an)). We can read from the
biconditional that any relation satisfied by a sequence of objects in the structure is also satisfied
by their corresponding images under the automorphism. This fact about automorphism poses a
serious problem for ante rem structuralists. The reason is that, seen through the lens of an ante
rem structuralist, mathematical objects are structureless, characterized solely by their relations
with other mathematical objects. They are not labeled by any names, by which we can trace
them from one automorphic structure to another. Suppose ak and j(ak) are distinct objects in
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the structure A. How ak is related with a1, ..., an in the original structure is exactly the same as
how j(ak) is related with j(a1), ..., j(an) in the structure automorphic to the original one. There is
no way to tell one apart from the other by their structural relations alone. Therefore, if ante rem
structuralists are to use structural relations to provide criteria of identity for objects in a structure
admitting of non-trivial automorphisms, they have to be committed to the view that two distinct
mathematical objects that are structurally indiscernible are identical, which is absurd.
To explain the problem in a more concrete way, we consider a simple directed graph, G1:
({a, b, c}; {〈a, b〉, 〈a, c〉}). By sending b to c, c to b, and a to a, we have an automorphism for the
structure. Here is the problem. By appealing to the structural relations alone, we can only single
out a from the other two objects, because it is the only object which points to two distinct objects,
i.e. satisfying the 1-place relation defined by ∃y∃z(y 6= z ∧ xRy ∧ xRz). The other two objects,
however, are indistinguishable, because each of them does not point to any objects and is pointed
to by one object. So, if ante rem structuralists are committed to the proposal of relative identity,
they have to hold that b and c are the same object.
This problem poses a serious challenge to ante rem structuralists. Insofar as they are committed
to the thesis of relative identity, they have to accept results that are unfaithful to mathematical
practice. i = −i is true on the complex number structure because the two numbers share the
same structural relations. 3 = 4 is true on 〈R,<〉 because with the automorphism f(x) = x + 1,
we can show that 3 and 4 share the same structural relations. Is there a way out for ante rem
structuralists? In the following, we consider two attempted solutions to the problem.
2. Ladyman's Solution and Quine's Notion of Weak Discernibility
To solve the problem of automorphism, Ladyman invokes Quine's notion of weak discernibility
([22], pp. 61-64; [24]): two objects are `weakly discernible' just in case there is two-place irreflexive
relation that they satisfy ([17], p. 220). The upshot of his solution is that we can provide criteria
of identity for mathematical objects by identifying irreflexive relations in the structure to which
they belong. His solution can be given the following logical form:
(L) ∀x∀y(Fx ∧ Fy → (x = y ↔ ∀R(∀z ∼ Rzz →∼ Rxy)))
What this schema means is that for any two objects x, y belonging to the same L-structure (strictly
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speaking, the same ante rem structure exemplified by the L-structure), they are identical if and
only if x and y do not satisfy any irreflexive relation definable in the language L. Ladyman does not
mention explicitly that the irreflexive relation involved in the identity criteria has to be understood
as one definable in the language L. However, from the examples which he uses to illustrate the
resourcefulness of this schema, we can reasonably assume that the irreflexive relation he refers to
has to be so understood.
Ladyman suggests that with this schema, we can rescue ante rem structuralists from the problem
of automorphism with respect to the complex number structure 〈C,+, ·, 0, 1〉 and the group 〈Z,+〉.
For example, with i and -i, which are structurally indiscernible and are hence identical on Shapiro's
schema, we can now differentiate one from the other by defining the irreflexive relation `is the
additive inverse of' by the formula x+ y = 0. Since i and −i satisfy an irreflexive relation definable
in the language, they cannot be the same object according to (L). We can use the same relation
`is the additive inverse of' with the structure 〈Z,+〉 to differentiate z from −z, for any z ∈ Z . So,
Ladyman's solution seems to solve the problem of automorphism.
However, two questions are in order. First, does his solution really work  even for complex
numbers? Further, can the schema provide criteria of identity for structures where there is no
definable irreflexive relations? Second, what are his motivations for adopting a Quinean notion of
identity for a problem in philosophy of mathematics? Is Quine's project relevant to our project of
making clear the nature of mathematical objects?
I answer the first question in the negative. It is far from clear why Ladyman takes a particular
case as a solution of a more general problem of differentiating a+ bi from a− bi. Setting aside for
now whether the relation x+ y = 0 can be singled out while the identities of the relata are at issue,
it is not clear how this relation can settle the identities for the pair a+ bi and a− bi, where a 6= 0.10
For example, what is the suitable irreflexive relation for 2 + i and 2− i? Ladyman does not provide
us with any. So, his solution lacks generality.
There may be, however, one way we can rescue his solution. Drawing inspirations from Quine's
program of reduction of identity ([22], [24]), we can provide a trivial irreflexive relation for a+bi and
a− bi for all a, b ∈ R. The following irreflexive relation ϕ(x, y) is true for any two distinct complex
numbers: ∃z1∃z2(x + z1 = z2 ∧ y + z1 6= z2)), because it trivially means that any two distinct
complex numbers cannot give the same sum when operated under addition with the same complex
10For discussions as to whether a relation can be ontologically prior to its relata, see Hellman's [12] (pp.193-194).
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number. It seems to be an irreflexive relation no less respectable than Ladyman's  ϕ(x, x) is
false for any x ∈ C. It is more general than Ladyman's in that it can ground the identities for all
complex numbers. It also does not attribute to complex numbers any non-structural properties.
So, it should be acceptable as a solution to the problem of automorphism  if Ladyman's proposal
is. However, we are faced with very difficult issues once we are committed to this generalized form
of Ladyman's solution. (i) Does the relation exist before the identities of the relata are settled? Do
we in using this relation to give a criterion of identity for the complex numbers already presuppose
their distinctness? (ii) If one does say that this relation is ontologically prior to the relata and
hence it is legitimate to use it to ground the identities of the relata, how should we make sense of
that claim? (iii) Would one make more sense if she proposes a mutual dependence thesis on which
neither the relata nor the relations are prior to each other? These are difficult questions that may
make us desist from adopting this as a repair of Ladyman's solution.11
Fortunately, we need not answer these difficult questions to see that Ladyman's solution 
whether it is generalized or not  is not going to work. The attraction of using an irreflexive relation
to solve the problem of automorphism can be further weakened if we think about some simple graphs.
Take G1: ({a, b, c}; {〈a, b〉, 〈a, c〉}), an example Button [6] uses to undermine Ladyman's solution.
It is not clear how we can find within this structure an irreflexive relation that is satisfied by b and
c. We can go even further than Button does in using a structureless graph, analogous to Shapiro's
oft-mentioned finite cardinal structures ([30], p. 115; [31], pp. 141-142), to undermine Ladyman's
solution. Call it G0: ({a, b, c}; ∅). It seems very few will be tempted to adopt Ladyman's solution
or its generalized version and say that there is actually one point on the graph.
We now come to the second question: what are Ladyman's motivations for borrowing from Quine
the notion of weak discernibility? His answer to the question is disappointing for two reasons. First,
in justifying his use of the notion, he appeals to the works of philosophers of physics, highlighting
the purchase of weak discernibility in quantum physics. It is, however, not clear what makes
it legitimate for Ladyman to directly apply views concerning the identity conditions of physical
entities to the identity conditions of mathematical objects. In so doing, he makes the nature of
mathematical objects dependent on how the physical world is like. However, there seems to be
11A possible source of these difficulties is that ante rem structuralists do not make clear the dependence relation
between relata and relations. They also do not make clear whether the structural relations they refer to include the
definable ones or not, and if they do, what restrictions should be set on them  for example, whether the identity
symbol can be used in defining a relation.
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no reason to rule out mathematical structures that are unlike any structure exemplifiable in the
physical world. Second, what is also unclear is why we need identity conditions for all mathematical
objects in the first place. Ladyman does not provide us with any answer to that.
3. Button's Hybrid Solution
We now consider another attempted solution to the problem of automorphism which respects
Shapiro's proposal of providing structure-relative identity conditions for mathematical objects.
Button offers a hybrid solution to the problem, which he characterizes as realistic at its core
and eliminativistic at its limits ([6], p. 216). His solution is to hold that ante rem structures
exhibiting non-trivial automorphisms are not objects; they are constructed from positions of basic
structures, the rigid structures that really exist. Since structures admitting of non-trivial automor-
phisms are not objects, sentences about positions in them have to be treated in an eliminativist
way, along the lines of the universalized version of set theoretical structuralism we discussed in the
second chapter.
This solution seems to be intended to take the best out of eliminativist structuralism and ante
rem structuralism. First, in rejecting the existence of structures admitting of automorphism, we
seem to achieve some success in ontological reduction. To have a diversity of mathematical objects,
we only need to construct them out of positions from the basic structures. It is not necessary to
include in our ontology more entities than is necessary for the diversity of mathematical objects.
Our acceptance of ante rem structuralism at its core already ensures that we have an abundant
number of objects to construct a multiplicity of mathematical structures. Second, with ante rem
structuralism to provide the background ontology, we do not fall into the problem of non-vacuity
facing set theoretical structuralists, which behooves them to remedy it by privileging set theory.
However, if we take seriously the desiderata of different forms of structuralism, it is not clear
what Button is trying to achieve, except to provide us with a trivial solution to the problem of
automorphism. First, assessed from the perspective of a set theoretical structuralist, Button's
ontological reduction is not thorough-going. For a set theoretical structuralist, all mathematical
objects are reduced to sets. She does not have to countenance the existence of a universe of abstract
universals as ante rem structuralists do. She also does not need to answer difficult questions about
the nature of individual numbers and of the natural number structure, or whether the natural
number 2 is identical to the real number 2, because on her view such things do not exist. All the
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difficult matters with the nature of mathematical objects are deferred to the level of sets. So, in
not opting for a thorough-going ontological reduction, that is, in accepting the existence of rigid
ante rem structures, Button is under the burden of giving us a solution to Benacerraf's problem
regarding positions in all rigid structures. This does not seem to be attractive from the perspective
of a set theoretical structuralist. Also, being a mathematical realist about sets, a set theoretical
structuralist can rightly point out that, on Button's proposal, it seems it is up to us to determine
which mathematical objects should exist based on whether they belong to a structure which admits
of non-trivial automorphism(s). However, is there really any real metaphysical difference between
symmetric structures and the rigid ones?
Second, in adopting a hybrid solution, we need to have a hybrid semantics. How should we
understand the logical forms of the following sentences:
(B1) There are at least three numbers in the natural number structure.
(B2) There are at least three numbers in the complex number structure.
(B3) So, there are at least six mathematical objects.
A universalized set theoretical structuralist can apply the translation procedure to (B1) and (B2)
reducing away the apparent commitment to the existence of numbers in them and argue that
although (B3) is true  for they countenance the existence of sets  it does not follow from
(B1) and (B2). An ante rem structuralist, taking these sentences at face value, can pronounce
immediately that the three sentences make up a valid argument. A hybrid structuralist will say
(B2) is of a different kind than (B1) and (B3); they cannot be treated under the same semantics.
This consequence is undesirable from the standpoints of both eliminative structuralists and ante
rem structuralists  particularly so for ante rem structuralists who hold that it is preferable to be
faithful to mathematical practice by taking mathematical sentences at their face value.
Third, it is not unfair to ask whether a hybrid solution needs a hybrid epistemology to sustain.
Is the natural number structure, which exists as an abstract universal on Button's proposal, known
differently than natural numbers under linear ordering, which are merely constructions? Is an
asymmetric graph known differently than a graph with symmetries? It is not clear whether we have
two modes of knowing mathematics  one for rigid structures and one for non-rigid structures.
So, Button does not provide us with a good solution to the problem of automorphism either.
What routes should ante rem structuralists take in the face of the problem? I will argue that they
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should drop their thesis of relative identity as a convenient tool to solve Benacerraf's problem of
multiple reductions of arithmetic, because the thesis not only leads to the problem of automorphism,
which we seem to have good reasons to believe is insurmountable, it can also be put into doubt,
despite the fact that it is well-entrenched in philosophy.
4. What Criteria of Identity Could Be
Primitive identity for mathematical objects in the same structure
The reasonable route for ante rem structuralists to take, I submit, is to drop the thesis of relative
identity and take identities among mathematical objects in the same structure as primitive, that is,
as facts that need not be given an account of using the schema (IC) I mention at the beginning of
this chapter. This move, however, is not considered by Ladyman and is strongly opposed by Button
for reasons we shall discuss shortly. Before I examine in detail the possible reasons for supporting
the thesis of relative identity, I make the following two preliminary remarks.
First, judging from what we have discussed thus far, there is a strong prima facie case against
the thesis of relative identity. The thesis of relative identity is attractive to ante rem structuralists
because it supports the thesis of incompleteness of mathematical objects, which allows them to
block Benacerraf's question of whether one object from one structure can be identical to an object
from another structure. Ante rem structuralists gain from their commitment to the thesis of relative
identity a clean and convenient solution to Benacerraf's problem. However, as I have suggested
at the beginning of this chapter, the commitment to relative identity makes it difficult for us to
account for the meaningfulness of identity statements relating an object inside a mathematical
structure to an object outside of it. It is not clear why the statements (i) `a chess piece is identical
to the natural number 2' and (ii) `every natural number is equal to the sum of two real numbers'
should be considered senseless because of our commitment to the thesis of relative identity. I do
not rule out that ante rem structuralists can come up with ingenious solutions to account for their
meaningfulness in a way that is consistent with the thesis of relative identity.12 So, we at best
can make here a weak prima facie case against the thesis of relative identity. However, with the
problem of automorphism established, we have good reason to think that adherents of the thesis of
12One possible solution is to come up with a kind which subsumes the two objects in question. However, the
problem with this solution is that there does not seem to be a principled way to determine the point at which we
cannot subsume two kinds under a more general kind.
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relative identity are on the defensive.13 Ante rem structuralists who appeal to the thesis of relative
identity are under the obligation of explaining why, amidst various difficulties, we have to adopt
the thesis.
Second, taking identity to be primitive need not be seen as a desperate move by ante rem
structuralists to solve the problem of automorphism in a trivial way. I submit that it can be
motivated by ante rem structuralists' official commitments. On ante rem structuralism, [t]he
structure is [ontologically] prior to the mathematical objects it contains, just as any organization
is prior to the offices that constitute it ([30], p. 78). Setting aside Shapiro's use of a perhaps
misleading analogy, we consider the following conceptual possibility.14 Given that an ante rem
structure is ontologically prior to the objects that belong to it, instead of looking first at how the
objects are individuated, we should first ask what is essential to an ante rem structure. The natural
answer to the question is `its mathematical properties', given ante rem structualists' commitment
to the faithfulness constraint. G0, a structureless graph with three objects in it, cannot be what it
is without three distinct points in it. The complex number structure cannot be what it is with any
pair of (a+bi, a−bi) taken as one object. The distinctness of mathematical objects in a structure is
essential to its existence. Without the existence of an ante rem structure, there are no mathematical
objects whose identities are to be questioned. It seems that adherents of relative identity neglect
ante rem structuralists' view about the dependence relation between structures and positions. On
ante rem structuralism, positions depend for their existence on the structure to which they belong.
So, they are wrong in asking questions about the individuation of mathematical objects without
first asking questions about what is essential to the existence of a structure.
Since an ante rem structuralist can motivate intra-structural primitive identities along the lines I
discuss here, friends of criteria of identity opposed to this move should point out why this conceptual
possibility is illusory.
13I do not discuss in length other possible but less plausible solutions to the problem of automorphism. They
include the (a) invocation of haecceities and (b) the appeal to extra-structural relations. The former runs against
the ante rem structuralism's tenet that a mathematical object has only intra-structural properties. It also leads
to an explosion of isomorphic ante rem structures with objects having different haecceities, which generates the
same Benacerrafian problem on the level of ante rem structures. The second solution fails because the choice of
extra-structural relations is completely arbitrary. There seems to be no principled way of explaining why a particular
extra-structural relation applies only to one object but not to its image under a non-trivial automorphism.
14The reason why the analogy is misleading is that an organization fails to capture what a mathematical structure
is like. An organization can be what it is if certain offices are removed from it, but it is not case with mathematical
structures. For example, the natural number structure cannot be what it is if the 1-place is removed from it.
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The well-entrenched notion of criteria of identity
Given that we have a prima facie case against the the provision of structure-relative criteria of iden-
tity and a case for adopting primitive identity for objects within the same mathematical structure,
how can friends of criteria of identity sustain their thesis? In order not to trivialize their position,
before assessing their arguments for the thesis I should note that the notion of criteria of identity
does not come out of nowhere, stipulated on an ad hoc basis to solve the Benacerrafian problem.
Criteria of identity is in fact a well-entrenched notion in philosophy. Philosophers seem to have
no solace until they can find the identity conditions for the objects they admit into the ontology.
Different kinds of objects  whether or not they are physical or mathematical  are given criteria
of identity in a sentence of the form (IC) or its variants. The following is an assortment of these
attempts:
(D)∀x∀y((Line(x) ∧ Line(y))→ d(x) = d(y)↔ x ‖ y))
[T]he direction of line x is identical with the direction of line y if and only if lines x and y are
parallel with one another (Frege [8], p. 136; Lowe [18], p. 620).
(NF )∀F∀G(Nx : Fx = Nx : Gx↔ ∃R({x : Fx}1− 1R{x : Gx})
[T]he number of F s is identical with the number of Gs if and only if the set of F s is one to one
correlated with the set of Gs (Frege [8], p. 135; Lowe [18], p. 620).
(E)∀x∀y((E(x) ∧ E(y))→ (x = y ↔ ∀z(E(z)→ ((C(x, z)↔ C(y, z)) ∧ (C(z, x)↔ C(z, y))))))
[I]f x and y are events, then x is identical with y if and only if x and y cause and are caused by
the same events (Davidson [7], p.179; Lowe [18], p.621).
(Qc)Classes are identical if and only if their members are identical (Quine [23], p.100).
(Qo)Physical objects are identical if and only if they are coextensive (Quine [23], p. 101).
What is the notion of criteria of identity for? According to some philosophers, it allows us to
distinguish between entities that are metaphysically respectable and those that are not. Only
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entities for which identity criteria exist can be admitted into the ontology. For example, according
to Lowe,
What is crucial to the status of `thinghood' ... is ... the possession of determinate
identity-conditions ... This is where the notion of a `thing' or `object' ties in with
that of a criterion of identity, for one guarantee that something possesses determinate
identity-conditions is that it falls under a general concept which supplies a criterion of
identity for its instances ([18], p. 613).
[W]e are entitled to deny the status of `objects' to facts and propositions (on the grounds
that they lack determinate identity-conditions) ([18], p. 618).
According to some philosophers, criteria of identity also have an epistemic role of allowing us to
provide a truth value for an identity statement or of understanding the nature of the objects for
which we provide criteria of identity. So, it seems the notion of identity criteria is generally regarded
in philosophy to have both metaphysical and epistemological purchase. It is therefore a daunting
task to argue that it has no purchase at all in philosophy. Given that the goal of this chapter is to
answer the question of whether it is right for ante rem structuralists to adopt the thesis of relative
identity, I am not going to examine whether there is any unity in different philosophers' uses of the
notion of identity criteria beyond their formal similarity; which philosophical projects can justify
the use of the notion and which cannot; or whether the dictum of no entity without kind-relative
identity criteria should be taken as a first principle in answering ontological questions. These issues
are of a depth that this thesis cannot adequately address. I only seek to answer a narrower question
of whether there are overriding reasons for ante rem structuralists to be committed to the dictum.
I argue that the purported purchase of the dictum can be put into doubt on both the metaphysical
and the epistemological fronts.
Purported metaphysical purchase of criteria of identity
One purported metaphysical function of criteria of identity is that they provide properties and
relations on which the identity of objects supervene. Button and Keranen articulate this view in
the following way:
[A]ccepting indistinguishables [as distinct objects] requires that identity facts are prim-
itive, for there are no properties or relations upon which the distinctness of individuals
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could supervene (Button [6], p. 219, emphasis mine).
To the best of our knowledge, all extant theories of ontology maintain that the identity
of objects is governed by their properties ... `a = b' is true if and only if for all properties
φ in some class Φ, φ(a) if and only if φ(b) (Keranen [15], p. 313, emphasis mine).
I maintain that ... there are no distinct but essentially indiscernible objects ... [G]iven
any domain of objects, I believe that there must be some fact that metaphysically
underwrites the distinctness of any two distinct objects in that domain. Suppose you
think that the objects a and b are essentially indiscernible and yet distinct; you must
still think that there is something about the world that is responsible for the objects
being two and not one. Suppose that you think that the non-essential properties of a
and b are not up to the task; you must still think that there is something about the
world that is. Suppose that you think that it is a primitive, `brute' fact that a and b are
two objects there rather than one; surely you must still think that there is something
about each one that makes it the case that it is the object it is, and not the other.
(Keranen [16], p. 156).
I have the following three remarks on this view. First, it has to be noted that the admission of
having a certain haecceity as a property makes the view entirely trivial. If such a property is
allowed, adherents of the supervenience view can always find relations and properties that ground
 or in my view, bear the appearance of grounding  identity. By the something about each
one, Keranen means haecceity, a property that can be possessed by one entity alone ([15], p.
313)  an example is the property of `being identical to itself'. Of course, two objects x and y
are the same if they share the property of having a haecceity H, the something in the world that
grounds the identity fact. However, it is not clear what this grounding of identity can do for us,
except to secure the metaphysical conviction of certain philosophers. It is not clear why one should
stop at the level of having the same haecceity. Why is the sameness of haecceity not grounded
by properties that are more basic? Why is the bruteness of sameness of haecceity better than the
bruteness of identity?
Second, if we remove having a certain haecceity as an acceptable property from the superve-
nience thesis, it is not difficult to see that the thesis that identity can supervene on relations or
properties does not work. Consider again our simple graphs G0 and G1. Suppose they did exist
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without being embedded into others structures.15 There are three points in each of them. For G0,
it is obvious that there are no structural relations on which the identity of the three objects in it can
supervene. For G1, if identity did supervene on relations, there can be only two objects, because
b and c share the same relational properties on the graph and have to be taken as one object. So,
identity cannot supervene on relations or properties in general.16 Can one argue that the use of this
example is unwarranted because these graphs, which admit of non-trivial automorphisms, do not
exist? I do not know how to adequately answer this question. I can only retort in the following way:
one must have understood my examples in proposing the objection. If she does think that identity
has to supervene on relations, could she explain what she understands using relational properties
alone?
Third, if my examples fail to convince the adherents of the supervenience view, I shall appeal to
Kripke's arguments in Identity and Necessity ([14]). A name rigidly designates the same person
in different counterfacutal situations in which she exists. If identity is to supervene on relations,
we may end up talking about a person resembling to a high degree the person in question but not
being the same person as the person in question. So, again, the moral is that identity does not
supervene on relations or properties.
Purported epistemic purchase of criteria of identity
We now consider two possible epistemic functions of identity criteria: (i) identity criteria allow us
to understand what it is to be an instance of a kind K; (ii) identity criteria allow us to have access
to identity facts.
According to Keranen, in some sense the Axiom of Extensionality tells us what makes a set,
it codifies a key ingredient in our understanding of what sets are in the first place ([16], p. 328).
He seems to suggest here that the criteria of identity of sets as encapsulated in the axiom of
extensionality allow us to understand what it is to be a set. Learning from Savellos's [29] discussion
of criteria of identity of events and Merricks's [20] discussion of the criteria of identity over time,
we can give Keranen the following response. Indeed, the axiom of extensionality does tell us
something important about a set, namely, its membership relation. However, the axiom does not
tell us other important things about sets. For examples, sets of a very large size, which cannot find
15I add this supposition here because I want to block the possible counter-argument that G0 is an object because
it is embedded in a structure within which the positions in G0 are structurally discernible.
16One can use these examples to show that Quine's reduction of identity ([22], [24]) does not yield genuine identity.
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concrete exemplications in our world, are essentially abstract; pure sets are essentially positions
of a structure, etc. So, criteria of identity do not seem to have a central role in allowing us to
understand what it is to be an instance of a kind K.
As to the second epistemic function, Button provides for us the following articulation:
Suppose m and n have at all times all the same properties (including being at the same
location, if they are located at all) and all the same relations to everything. I say that
m = n, as does [Ladyman] ... [I]t is unclear how we could have access to primitive
identity facts ... [I]f we cannot know whether m and n are one object or two, we also
cannot know whether m is one object, or three, or four, ... ([6], p. 219, emphasis mine).
Two remarks are in order. First, his argument seems to be that if there are no criteria of identity,
we have to take identity facts to be primitive; yet epistemic access to primitive identity facts cannot
be established. Here he is trying to argue for the epistemic merit of criteria of identity in general.
However, his argument seems to be motivated by a philosophical position on what counts as the
same physical object. It is not clear whether mathematical objects have to be of the same nature
as physical objects. I suspect Button makes the same mistake Ladyman does in applying directly
the notion of physical objecthood to mathematical objects. This suspicion is confirmed as he says
later in his paper that
bG1 and cG1 bear no relations to each other even though they are objects in the same
configuration. This is arguably inconceivable. Such objects could not be spatial, for
distinct spatial objects are invariably at a distance from each other but not from them-
selves (i.e. an irreflexive relation obtains between them) ... [I]f bG1 and cG1 are objects,
they are unlike any objects with which I am familiar ([6], p. 219).
He concludes that the two objects b and c on the graph G1 cannot be objects on the grounds that
they do not share any resemblance with physical objects. It is not clear why mathematical objects
need to have any resemblance with spatial objects. Also, his remarks are not in keeping with the
structuralist slogan that a mathematical object has only relations it has with other objects in the
same structure. Why is its resemblance to spatial objects essential to its existence? Bourbaki's
insights are helpful here.
Second, Button's conclusion that we cannot have epistemic access to primitive identity facts is
questionable. He seems to suggest that we need criteria of identity to ground our knowledge of
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all identity facts. However, this suggestion is doubtful. Indeed, at times, we do need to appeal
to criteria of identity to have knowledge of certain identity facts. For example, with the identity
statement A ∪ (B ∪ C) = (A ∪ B) ∪ C, we have to appeal to the axiom of extensionality which
supplies the criteria of identity of sets in order to ground this particular fact  by doing a proof,
for example. However, this is certainly not the case for all our knowledge of mathematics. Take our
learning of numbers as an example. Do we really need an identity criteria statement as stringent
as (N) ∀x∀y(Number(x) ∧Number(y)→ (x = y ↔ ∀z(z < x↔ z < y))) to tell 1 6= 2? It may be
more plausible to think that 1 6= 2 is epistemically prior to (N), rather than the other way round.
Conclusion
Participants in the debate on ante rem structuralism appeal to the notion of criteria of identity to
urge ante rem structuralists to adopt their suggested positions  however unfavorable they are.
With Keranen, given his commitment to governance of identity by relations and properties, he leaves
ante rem structuralists the dilemma of either (a) accepting that structurally indiscernible objects
should be taken as the same object or (b) explaining their distinctness by appealing to haecceities
and hence violating the tenet of no properties except structural properties. His arguments amount
to rejecting ante rem structuralism outright, because neither (a) nor (b) is acceptable to an ante
rem structuralist. With Button, respecting the notion of criteria of identity, he offers a hybrid
solution, which, as I have discussed above, is also not attractive to ante rem structuralists.
However, as our discussion shows, the purchase of the notion of criteria of identity in discussions
of the nature and knowledge of mathematical objects can be doubted. So, both Keranen and Button
are not entitled to urge ante rem structuralists to make the revisions they suggest by their appeal
to the notion of criteria of identity. With the notion of criteria of identity cleared away, ante rem
structuralists should adopt primitive identity with respect to objects in the same mathematical
structure, which, as my preliminary remarks of this section suggest, can be motivated by their
official commitments to the ontological priority of structure over positions and the faithfulness
constraint. Also, adopting primitive identity within a structure can prevent ante rem structuralists
from running into the problem of automorphism, which we have reason to believe is irresolvable.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS: ANTE REM STRUCTURALISM WITHOUT IDENTITY
CRITERIA
1. Conclusion: The Benacerrafian Problem Is Left Unsolved
Despite the strong grounds we have for urging ante rem structuralists to drop the thesis of relative
identity, there is now the pressing issue of Benacerraf's problem of multiple reductions of arithmetic.
The thesis of relative identity, according to our discussion in the second chapter, is to support
the thesis of ontological incompleteness of mathematical objects, which is intended to block the
Benacerrafian problem. However, with relative identity dropped due to the reasons we discussed
in the last chapter, the thesis of incompleteness of mathematical objects is left with no support; so
the Benacerrafian problem demands from ante rem structuralists an alternative solution.
However, Shapiro in his recent works ([31], [32]) does not provide us with a satisfactory alter-
native solution, although he is well aware that cross-structural identities  such as the example I
gave in the last chapter every natural number is the sum of two real numbers  cannot be banned
as senseless:
[S]ome cross-structural identities are at least prima facie natural, and perhaps even
inevitable. Suppose that during a lecture, a mathematician writes a closed integral on a
blackboard, and asks the class to determine whether the number it denotes is a natural
number. A philosophy student, fresh from a study of structuralism  having read part
of Resnik's book and/ or part of mine  quickly gets the floor while the other students
are busy trying to resolve the integral, and proudly announces the solution: there is
no fact of the matter. He says that the integral denotes a place in the real number
structure, and so it is indeterminate whether places from the real number structure are
the same as or distinct from places in the natural number structure. Clearly, something
has gone wrong; the philosophy student is confused ([31], p. 125).
His current solution to the Benacerrafian problem is as follows:
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[T]he natural number 2, the real number 2, and the set {∅, {∅}} are tied to different
structures and so they are distinct objects ([31], p. 128).
The mathematician asked a sensible, substantive mathematical question. The job of
the student was to answer it, and our job as philosophers is to interpret it. Following
the faithfulness constraint, I wanted the mathematician's language to be understood
literally, at face value. My solution ... was that the mathematical community had
stipulated that non-negative whole numbers of the real number structure are indeed the
natural numbers. This makes the mathematician's question a proper mathematical one
([31], p. 125, Shapiro's own emphasis).
Shapiro's solution to the problem has two components. First, Shapiro answers the Benacerrafian
questions of whether 2natural is identical to 2real and whether 2natural is identical to {∅, {∅}} in
the negative: strictly speaking, 2natural = 2real and, by extension, 2natural = {∅, {∅}} are false,
because they are identity statements relating distinct objects from different mathematical struc-
tures.17 However, identity sentences involving objects from distinct ante rem structures abound
in mathematics. To claim that they are false is to violate the faithfulness constraint. Hence the
need for the second component of the solution, which is to concede that mathematicians can by
stipulation make it the case that 2natural = 2real and 2natural = {∅, {∅}}.
The second component is problematic, because it runs against the commitment of mathematical
realism. How can mathematicians make it the case that 2natural = 2real and 2natural = {∅, {∅}} if
in each of them an identity relation is established between two distinct objects from two distinct
mathematical structures? On further reflection, the first component of the solution can also be cast
into doubt. Why should we think that 2natural, 2real, and {∅, {∅}} denote three distinct objects
belonging to three distinct ante rem structures?
Here is Shapiro's reason for why 2natural, 2real, {∅, {∅}} denote three distinct objects in three
distinct mathematical structures:
The natural number 2 and the real number 2 and the set {∅, {∅}} enjoy different relations
to different objects. It is part of the essence of the real number 2 that it has a square
17Unfortunately, Shapiro does not say explicitly that they are false. He says only that (i) natural number 2, real
number 2, and von Neumann 2 are distinct objects ([31], p. 128) and that (ii) he withdraws his claim about the
need to provide identity criteria for mathematical objects ([31], pp. 140-141; [32]). However, does (ii) suggest that
(iii) he already abandons relative identity and hence withdraws his claim in [30] that identity statements involving
objects from different mathematical structures `make no sense'? If so, (i) and (iii) do suggest that the sentences
2natural = 2real and 2 = {∅, {∅}} are false.
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root, it is greater than this square root, and it is less than pi. The natural number 2
does not have those properties ([31], p. 128).
The upshot of this explanation is that 2natural, 2real, {∅, {∅}} denote three distinct objects be-
cause the three objects denoted have different relational properties. This explanation, I suspect,
is question-begging. It is not clear what precludes the following possibility. In the realm of ante
rem structures, the natural number structure is embedded in the real number structure, and both
the natural number structure and the real number structures are embedded in a set theoretical
structure. In this case, 2natural, 2real, and {∅, {∅}} denote one and the same object in the universe
of ante rem structures  call it p. p is situated in the natural number structure, the real number
structure, and the set theoretical structure in which the natural number structure and the real
number structured are embedded. p cannot be what it is without entering into the smaller-than
relation with its square root in the real number structure, or entering into the smaller-than relation
with pi in the same structure. It cannot be what it is without having 3 as its successor in the natural
number structure. Also, p cannot be what it is without entering into the membership relation with
the empty set and its singleton. p is a position with multiple structural essences.
Since a mathematical object is merely a structureless point on ante rem structuralism, there
seems to be no reason for ante rem structuralists to block the possibility of a mathematical object
occupying multiple offices. One cannot argue that this proposal makes the existence of numbers
contingent on the existence of sets and hence privilege set theory. The reason is that, on ante
rem structuralism, each structure self-exemplifies and hence exist necessarily. So, even though the
natural number structure is embedded in a set theoretical structure, it does not seem to make sense
to say that numbers depends for their existence on the existence of the set theoretical structure.
Therefore, it appears that Shapiro's solution to the Benacerrafian problem is unsatisfactory.
The failure of ante rem structuralism to solve the problem raises the question of whether ante rem
structuralists are misguided right at the beginning in proclaiming that they can solve Benacerraf's
problem. Given their commitment that mathematical entities are objects, various questions about
the identity of these objects seem to be unavoidable. Would it be preferable for ante rem structural-
ists to concede that they cannot offer any satisfactory non-trivial solution to the problem and that
the attractiveness of their program lies not in its provision of a novel solution to the problem but
in its other merits such as its accommodation of set theory and its satisfaction of the faithfulness
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constraint?
2. Ending Remarks: Shapiro's Recent Thoughts on Identity Criteria
In this final section, I discuss what is in common between this project's diagnosis of the notion of
identity criteria and Shapiro's recent views on it. I also discuss several ways in which this project
is important, despite the similarity between this project's diagnosis of the notion and Shapiro's.
I have to concede that there happens to be a lot in common between this current project's
diagnosis of the notion of identity criteria and Shapiro's recent views on it.18 From his [32], we can
identify several arguments against the notion of identity criteria which complement our analysis in
the last chapter  two of them questioning the metaphysical purchase of the notion and one putting
into doubt the epistemic purchase of the notion. First, he raises the same issue with haecceities we
discuss in the last chapter. He argues that if the having of haecceity is acceptable as a property to
be used in an account of identity, identity can be trivially defined by the following truth in second-
order logic ∀x∀y(x = y ≡ ∀X(Xx ≡ Xy)); however, to do so is not very deep or interesting ([32],
p. 166). Second, he puts forward the an argument of regress, which is analogous to our earlier
question of whether we need a further analysis for the sameness of haecceities. His argument goes
in the following way. Suppose the identity of sets has to be governed by the schema:
(AE) ∀x∀y((Set(x) ∧ Set(y))→ (x = y ↔ ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)))
Shapiro's immediate question is whether we need a further analysis for the membership relation,
that is, whether we need a schema like the following:
(MS) ∀x∀y(x ∈ y ≡ )
Even if an account can be given for membership relation, we can ask further questions about the
relations used to give an account of the membership relation. Hence an infinite regress.
Shapiro's third argument touches on the epistemic primitiveness of identity, an issue we discuss
in response to Button's argument for the epistemic purchase of the notion of identity criteria. In
understanding implicit definitions of `natural number', `successor', `addition' and `multiplication',
18As my project proceeds, I fail to take into full consideration of Shapiro's [32]. It is only when my project is
almost complete that I realize the importance of Shapiro's remarks in his [32].
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Shapiro argues, our understanding of identity is already presupposed.
Despite the similarity between Shapiro's and this project's diagnosis of the notion of identity
criteria, my project is important for the following reasons. First, this project shows that Shapiro's
solution to the Benacerrafian problem runs against the commitment of mathematical realism and
neglects the possibility of embeddings among ante rem structures. I thereby identify an important
consequence of dropping the thesis of relative identity: the Benacerrafian problem, which motivates
structuralism, cannot be solved on ante rem structuralism.
Second, this project explains why there is a motivation for ante rem structuralists to adopt
the thesis of relative identity with schema (IC) I discuss in the second chapter. Given ante rem
structuralism's tenet that a mathematical object has no properties beyond its relations with other
objects in the same structure, there is a temptation for ante rem structuralists to deny trivial extra-
structural properties such as being distinct from an object from another mathematical structure
or from the non-mathematical realm. Ante rem structuralists succumb to the temptation because
in doing so they can provide a clean solution to the Benacerrafian problem. They can argue that
given that the number 2 does not have trivial extra-structural properties such as being distinct
from the set {∅, {∅}} or the set {{∅}}, there is no fact of the matter as to whether 2natural = {{∅}}
or 2natural = {∅, {∅}}.
Third, this project provides a way by which ante rem structuralists can accommodate the
primitiveness of identity for mathematical objects within a structure. By appealing to their official
commitment to the ontological priority of structure over positions and to the faithfulness constraint,
they can accommodate intra-structural primitive identity into their framework and hence block the
problem of automorphism from the start.
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